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2 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
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| a1d74cf36d | |||
| f60b0a0609 |
+28
-1
@@ -4,6 +4,32 @@ All notable changes to this project are documented here. The format
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follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/) and
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this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
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## [v0.1.1] — 2026-05-15
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### Changed
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- **`install.sh` now repairs data-dir permissions on every run.**
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Re-running the installer reasserts the canonical ownership
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(`quptime:quptime`) and modes across `/etc/quptime/` — `0750` on
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the dir, `0700` on `keys/`, `0600` on `node.yaml`, `cluster.yaml`,
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`trust.yaml`, and `keys/private.pem`, `0644` on `keys/public.pem`
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and `keys/cert.pem`. Makes the installer the one-step recovery
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path when something has tampered with modes (e.g. a stray
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`chmod -R`, a backup restore, or an accidental `sudo qu init`
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that left files owned by root). Unknown files in the dir are left
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alone.
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### Fixed
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- **CLI socket lookup as the daemon user.** `sudo -u quptime qu …`
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no longer fails with `dial daemon socket /tmp/quptime-quptime/…:
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no such file or directory` while the system daemon is running.
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`config.SocketPath()` now probes the canonical systemd location
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(`/run/quptime/quptime.sock`, then `/var/run/quptime/quptime.sock`)
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regardless of euid before falling back to per-user paths, so the
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CLI reaches the daemon's socket even when `sudo` has stripped
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`RUNTIME_DIRECTORY` and `XDG_RUNTIME_DIR` from the environment.
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## [v0.1.0] — 2026-05-15
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### Changed
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@@ -112,4 +138,5 @@ Initial public release.
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Planned for a future release.
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[v0.0.1]: https://git.cer.sh/axodouble/quptime/releases/tag/v0.0.1
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[v0.1.0]: https://git.cer.sh/axodouble/quptime/releases/tag/v0.1.0
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[v0.1.0]: https://git.cer.sh/axodouble/quptime/releases/tag/v0.1.0
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[v0.1.1]: https://git.cer.sh/axodouble/quptime/releases/tag/v0.1.1
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@@ -70,6 +70,15 @@ What it does:
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`/etc/systemd/system/quptime.service` (hardened — matches the unit
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in [systemd.md](deployment/systemd.md)). Enables but does not start
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the service, so you can configure identity before first boot.
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5. Repairs ownership and modes under `/etc/quptime/` to the canonical
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layout (`0750` on the dir, `0700` on `keys/`, `0600` on
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`node.yaml` / `cluster.yaml` / `trust.yaml` / `keys/private.pem`,
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`0644` on `keys/public.pem` / `keys/cert.pem`). This makes the
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installer idempotent for permission damage — if something
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tightened or loosened modes (a stray `chmod -R`, a misguided
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backup restore, an accidental `sudo qu init`), re-running
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`install.sh` puts everything back without touching the contents
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of those files.
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## Build from source
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@@ -172,7 +172,9 @@ still see this error, the most likely causes are:
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- The data directory is read-only or owned by a different user — the
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bootstrap can't write `node.yaml`. Fix permissions on
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`$QUPTIME_DIR`.
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`$QUPTIME_DIR`. The fastest fix on a standard install is just to
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re-run `install.sh` — it reasserts the canonical ownership and
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modes on the whole tree without touching your config.
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- Something else removed `node.yaml` mid-run (a config-management
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tool, a misconfigured volume). Re-run `qu serve` and it will
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rebuild from env, or run `qu init` manually with the flags you
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@@ -197,7 +199,9 @@ load private key: ...
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```
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Permissions on `keys/private.pem` are wrong — should be 0600 and owned
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by the daemon user. Fix and restart.
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by the daemon user. Fix and restart. Re-running `install.sh` on a
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standard install is the easiest path: it repairs ownership and modes
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on the entire data dir.
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## Probes look much slower than expected
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+51
-9
@@ -175,20 +175,62 @@ fi
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install -d -o "$SERVICE_USER" -g "$SERVICE_GROUP" -m 0750 "$DATA_DIR"
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# Reassert ownership on the dir's contents. Two cases this catches:
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# Repair ownership and permissions on the data dir's contents. Catches:
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# - re-running the installer over a previous install where the
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# service user/group changed
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# service user/group changed.
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# - the operator ran `qu init` or `qu serve` as root once (easy
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# mistake: `sudo qu init` is shorter than the documented
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# `sudo -u quptime qu init`). When the daemon runs as root its
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# DataDir() resolves to /etc/quptime, so any files it writes land
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# here owned by root:root mode 0600 — the systemd service then
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# fails with `open node.yaml: permission denied`.
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# chown -R only changes ownership, not perms, so file modes set by
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# the daemon (0600 for node.yaml, 0700 for keys/) are preserved.
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if [ -n "$(ls -A "$DATA_DIR" 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
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chown -R "$SERVICE_USER:$SERVICE_GROUP" "$DATA_DIR"
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fi
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# owned by root:root — the systemd service then fails with
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# `open node.yaml: permission denied`.
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# - someone or something (a stray `chmod -R`, a misguided backup
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# restore) tightened or loosened modes. Re-running the installer
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# should be enough to get back to a working baseline.
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# The canonical layout (mirrors the modes the daemon writes itself
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# in internal/config and internal/crypto):
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# /etc/quptime/ quptime:quptime 0750
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# /etc/quptime/keys/ quptime:quptime 0700
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# /etc/quptime/node.yaml quptime:quptime 0600
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# /etc/quptime/cluster.yaml quptime:quptime 0600
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# /etc/quptime/trust.yaml quptime:quptime 0600
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# /etc/quptime/keys/private.pem quptime:quptime 0600
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# /etc/quptime/keys/public.pem quptime:quptime 0644
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# /etc/quptime/keys/cert.pem quptime:quptime 0644
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# The runtime dir /var/run/quptime is owned by systemd via
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# RuntimeDirectory= and rebuilt at each service start, so we leave it
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# alone.
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repair_perms() {
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# Always reset the top-level dir mode — `install -d` only sets it
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# on creation, not on re-run.
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chown "$SERVICE_USER:$SERVICE_GROUP" "$DATA_DIR"
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chmod 0750 "$DATA_DIR"
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# Reassert ownership across the whole tree in one pass.
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if [ -n "$(ls -A "$DATA_DIR" 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
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chown -R "$SERVICE_USER:$SERVICE_GROUP" "$DATA_DIR"
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fi
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# keys/ is a directory with its own tighter mode.
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if [ -d "$DATA_DIR/keys" ]; then
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chmod 0700 "$DATA_DIR/keys"
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fi
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# Each known file gets its canonical mode if it exists. We don't
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# create anything that isn't already there — that's `qu init`'s
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# job — and we don't touch unknown files an operator may have
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# parked in the dir.
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local f
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for f in node.yaml cluster.yaml trust.yaml keys/private.pem; do
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[ -f "$DATA_DIR/$f" ] && chmod 0600 "$DATA_DIR/$f"
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done
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for f in keys/public.pem keys/cert.pem; do
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[ -f "$DATA_DIR/$f" ] && chmod 0644 "$DATA_DIR/$f"
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done
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}
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repair_perms
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echo "> reasserted ownership ($SERVICE_USER:$SERVICE_GROUP) and modes under $DATA_DIR"
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echo "> writing $SERVICE_FILE"
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cat > "$SERVICE_FILE" <<'EOF'
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+25
-12
@@ -58,19 +58,20 @@ func DataDir() string {
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// SocketPath returns the unix socket used for local CLI ↔ daemon control.
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//
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// Resolution order:
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// 1. $QUPTIME_SOCKET — explicit operator override
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// 1. $QUPTIME_SOCKET — explicit operator override.
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// 2. $RUNTIME_DIRECTORY — set by systemd when the unit declares
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// RuntimeDirectory=quptime. This is the path that matters in
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// practice: with User=quptime + PrivateTmp=true, the daemon's
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// /tmp is namespaced and invisible to the root CLI shell, so a
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// /tmp fallback yields "no such file" even though the daemon is
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// happily listening. Anchoring on $RUNTIME_DIRECTORY puts the
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// socket at /run/quptime/quptime.sock, which is the same inode
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// the root-CLI default (/var/run/quptime/…) reaches via the
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// /var/run → /run symlink.
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// 3. /var/run/quptime/… when euid is 0 (CLI side, packaged installs)
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// 4. $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/quptime/… for user-mode installs
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// 5. /tmp/quptime-<user>/… as a last resort
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// RuntimeDirectory=quptime. This is the path the daemon uses
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// when run under the packaged unit: /run/quptime/quptime.sock.
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// 3. The canonical system socket path — /run/quptime/quptime.sock —
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// if it exists. This catches the CLI side regardless of who is
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// invoking it: `sudo -u quptime qu status` strips RUNTIME_DIRECTORY
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// and XDG_RUNTIME_DIR, so without this probe the CLI falls all
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// the way through to /tmp/quptime-<user>/… and reports "no such
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// file" even while the daemon is happily listening.
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// 4. /var/run/quptime/… when euid is 0 (CLI side, packaged installs
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// on systems where /var/run isn't a symlink to /run).
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// 5. $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/quptime/… for user-mode installs.
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// 6. /tmp/quptime-<user>/… as a last resort.
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func SocketPath() string {
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if v := os.Getenv("QUPTIME_SOCKET"); v != "" {
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return v
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@@ -84,6 +85,18 @@ func SocketPath() string {
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}
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return filepath.Join(v, SocketName)
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}
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// If a system-managed daemon is already listening, route there
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// regardless of euid. Without this, `sudo -u quptime qu …` can't
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// find the socket the daemon (also running as quptime) created
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// via RuntimeDirectory=.
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for _, p := range []string{
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"/run/quptime/" + SocketName,
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"/var/run/quptime/" + SocketName,
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} {
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if _, err := os.Stat(p); err == nil {
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return p
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}
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}
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if os.Geteuid() == 0 {
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return "/var/run/quptime/" + SocketName
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}
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